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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini meneliti kaitan antara pulangan awal yang diperolehi dari penyenaraian syarikat di
papan penama dan kedua Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur (BSKL) dengan syarikat audit yang
digunakan dalam penyiapan dan penyemakan prospektus syarikat yang disenaraikan. Syarikat
audit dibahagikan kepada dua kumpulan, iaitu syarikat yang ternama (Tier 1) dan syarikat yang
tidak temama (Bukan Tier 1). Diandaikan bahawa syarikat audit yang ternama akan memberi
perkhidmatan audit yang berkualiti dan ini dapat mengurangkan tahap ketakpastian pelabur
terhadap porensi syarikat yang hendak disenaraikan. lni menyebabkan pulangan awal dari
penyenaraian adalah lebih rendah jika dibandingkan dengan pulangan awal dari syarikat yang
menggunakan perkidmatan audit dari syarikat audit yang tidak ternama. Penemuan kajian alas
213 syarikat yang disenaraikan di BSKL menunjukkan memang ada kecenderungan firma~firma
yang hendak menyenaraikan saham-sahamnya di BSKL untuk menggunakan perkhimatan syarikat-
syarikat audit yang ternama. Tidak terdapat perbezaan yang signifikan an tara pulangan awal dari
penyenaraian oleh syarikat yang menggunakan perkhidmatan syarikat audit yang temama dengan
yang tidak ternama. V\'alau bagaimanapun, pulangan awal syarikat~syarik.at yang disenaraikan di
papan kedua jauh lebih tinggi dari pulangan awal dari syarikat yang disenaraikan di papan
pertarna BSKL. Penemuan ini menunjukkan reputasi syarikat audit (iaitu sarna ada ternama atau
tidak) tidak berperanan sebagai penentu pulangan awal semasa penyenaraian. Penernuan ini
secara keseluruhannya adalah tekal dengan penemuan daripada k~ian yang lain (Shamsher &
Annual' 1997) yang menunjukkan bahawa pelabur di BSKL tidak membezakan kualiti perkhidmatan
audit yang diberikan oleh syarikat-syarikat audit yang ternalna dan yang tidak ternama.
ABSTRACT
The study examined the relationship between choice of quality differentiated audit firm and
initial return at listing. It is conjectured that the superior audit quality of Tier 1 audit firms helps
to reduce ex-ante uncertainty and consequently reduces the initial premiums at listing. The
findings show that there is an inclination for listed firms to engage Tier 1 audit firms, and no
significant difference in the initial returns of IPOs firms audited by either Tier 1 or Non-Tier 1
audit firms were obsenred. However, higher significant initial returns for new issues were observed
for Second Board firms relative to Main Board firms. The findings do not appear to suggest that
the auditor reputation is a determinant of initial returns at listing. The findings are consistent
with those documented by Shamsher and Annuar (1997) that investors are indifferent to the
quality of audit service provided by Tier 1 and Non-Tier 1 audit firms.
INTRODUCfION
The change of auditors prio,- to listing has been
an issue of interest among academics, investors,
and management in developed economies due
to its effect on underpricing or overpricing of
the new issue. It is a statutory requirement in
Malaysia for every company that goes public to
engage the services of merchant banks to help
them get listed. In the process, the companies
are required to provide prospectus audited by
independent auditors to verify the statements as
being true and fair view of the company. The
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prospectus normally contains information on
assets, historical profitability, economic prospects,
investment plans and some form of profit forecast
and dividends. The entrepreneurs usually disclose
favourable private information about the firm to
the potential investors so as to enhance
marketability of the offering without too much
offer premium. To add more credibility to the
basic information provided in the prospectus,
the management may engage the service of
reputable auditor. The reputation of the
accountants and auditors is potentially a signaling
device for conveying the credibility of the
information supplied to potential investors, since
investors might not have any other resource to
verify the information provided by a listing firm.
It may also reduce uncertainty and therefore the
level of premiums on the new listings, as investors
might be willing to pay a higher offer price for
the shares offered if the audit firm is more
reputable than the one engaged prior to going
public. Choice of quality differentiated audit
firm might provide a useful setting to ascertain
whether potential investors perceive the auditor
change as a signal of the level of uncertainty in
the new issue.
Though the information contained in (he
prospectus gives potentially useful information
to prospective investors there is also a great deal
of uncertainty surrounding the pricing of IPQ,
which is further complicated given limited
disclosures by companies prior to listing. In view
of the concern about the inherent risk associated
with rapid expansion of business activities being
financed by the proceeds from a new issue. fPO
represents a classic example of information
asymmetries between the pre-issue owners who
are the entrepreneurs and the investing public.
Entrepreneurs have detailed information on the
companies and their true worth whereas potential
investors have limited knowledge of the business
and its future economic prospects. Thus
independent auditors will serve as signaling
device in validating entrepreneurs' claims based
on private information about the potential value
of the firm to stockholders. There is no
documentation on this important issue in this
emerging Malaysian IPO market.
In view of the importance of the auditors'
choice at listing, this paper examines the effect
of choice of quality differentiated audit firms on
the IPQ premiums of newly listed finns in the
Kuala Lumpur Stock EXChange (KLSE). The
hypothesised relationship between the choice of
quality-differentiated audit and the initial return
of the IPOs is investigated.
The findings have implications for corporate
management decisions, the auditing profession.
investment adviser/banker and investors in
general. The documentation of the various
auditor choice and auditor switch and the effect
on the initial return (market premium) from
offerings will assist the corporate decision makers
to signal inside information to potential investors
before the listing. The findings would also
provide information to the audit profession
regarding public's perception on the quality
and differentiation of quality of audit services.
Investment adviser/banker would benefit from
the understanding of choice of auditor as a
signal of investment adviser/banker reputation
and the pricing strategy of the new issues. Finally,
the investing public could use this market signal
in formulating price expectation of the new
issues. Section 2 presents literature on the auditor
credibility and initial public offerings. Section 3
provides discussion on methodology. data
collection and return measurement techniques.
Section 4 provides discussion on findings and
the final section summarises the findings of the
paper.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The theory of the firm as amended to include
agency problem emphasises the importance of
auditing as a monitoring device Gensen and
Meckling 1976) to validate the management's
use of audited statements to convey a true and
fair view of the company to the potential investors
who have very limited access to the company's
private information. DeAngelo (198Ia;1981 b)
developed a demand and supply model for audit
quality. Audit quality is defined as the probability
that an auditor will both discover the breach of
contract (by the management and the investing
public) and the ability to subsequently report it.
An analogy from product differentiation
hypothesis is that firms use auditor choice as a
signaling device to reveal firm's desirable
characteristic. Firms appear to signal ex-ante
uncertainty by engaging the services of a
reputable audit firm. This signal is credible to
the market since the auditoris compensation is
higher exhibiting firm-specific reputation capital.
Finns with favourable information would prefer
the services of highly reputed auditors to reduce
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uncertainty. A switch to a prestigious audit firm
can enhance audit services because of superior
industry understanding, which help reduce
uncertainty of the value of information in
financial statements. Management may seek a
reputable auditor in an attempt to install a
better monitoring system and enhance the
principals' faith in the financial reporting system.
This would also portray to the potential
shareholders the managementis integrity and
good stewardship of shareholders. It is widely
perceived that higher prestige audit firm has
greater incentive not to perform low quality
audit (DeAngelo 1981).
It is well documented in the literature that
some companies replace their auditors before
going public for reasons of prestige. reputation
and greater technical ability (Carpenter and
Strawser 1971). The AlCPA (1978) and Lurie
(1977) examined the various reasons for auditor
switch and found that the larger and better-
known audit firms were believed to encourage
the sales of their shares. Francis and Wilson
(1988) documented that firms may change to
higher prestige audit firms (Big-Eight) to increase
marketability of the shares. It is also a common
practice among Malaysian firms to employ more
reputable auditors before listing. Huson et aL
(2001) examined the wealth effect of auditor
switch among Malaysian listed firms. They
documented no evidence of significant wealth
effect from auditor switch announcement. Thus,
auditor S\'iitch in this emerging capital market
conveys no information value associated with
auditor switch.
Unlike the corporate announcement of ex-
post events such as earnings, dividends, etc.,
which reflect real change in corporate
performance about expected future prospect of
a company. auditor change is an event that
conveys no direct apparent economic
information. Rather, the possible economic effect
from such event is the signal associated with
different interpretation about the quality of
auditor switch by the investors at large (Hagigi et
aL 1993).
DeAngelo (198Ia) found that financial
statement users do not directly observe the audit
procedure and have only limited information
about the auditor contractual arrangement.
However. they develop observable proxies for
audit procedures and auditor contractual
arrangement, which are associated with audit
quality. De Angelo (l98Ib) argues that larger
firms have greater incentive to supply high quality
audit services. It is also asserted that the size of
the audit firm signals audit quality, since larger
ones have more clients and accordingly, more
future quasi-rents will be lost if the auditor's
reputation is tarnished. Dopuch and Simunic
(1982) assert that larger audit firms have
differentiated themselves from other audit firms
in terms of higher audit quality. The assertion
on size and quality of audit firms suggests that
larger audit firms deliver higher quality audits
and are less likely to accede to client's pressure
regarding the use of questionable accounting
policies and practices. This is designed to build
confidence on the financial statement from the
auditors. If the company with a favourable private
information chooses to engage higher prestige
audit firm. the market should react favourably.
However, a switch to a lower prestige firm (non-
Big-B) is viewed negatively due to the shifting
signals of lesser quality standard (Hagigi et aL
1993; Johnson and Lys 1990). Therefore, the
market would probably respond positively to the
former and negatively to the latter moves.
From the agency perspective, a company's
audited financial statements provide a means for
owners to monitor the performance of the firm's
managers. Financial statements that are certified
by independent professional auditors provide
assurance about reliability and credibility. Wallace
(1980) suggests that increased credibility of
financial statements certified by credible auditors
reduce investors' uncertainty about the reliability
of the content of financial statements. This
suggests that the price effect on shares from
auditor switch actually is a proxy for the quality
of information under strict professional
applications of standards of a robust accounting
environment. Thus. financial statements attested
LO by a credible auditor provide believable
attestation about the quality of information
certified by the accounting profession
represented by particular auditor to investors. In
contrast, financial statements that are audited by
smaller audit firms, which are less reputable.
may not reduce investors' uncertainty about the
well being of a company. Hence. a costly search
by investors to evaluate the true and fair value of
the company is perpetrated in such situations.
Accordingly, market participants may lower the
price they are willing to pay for the securities of
such firms that switch to lower quality auditors.
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There are also conflicting opinions in some
studies. Contral), to the above arguments, some
of earlier studies are based on the argument
that professional standard imply homogeneity
across different size of audit firms such that
audit quality is independent of firm size. It was
further argued that audit quality is relatively
homogeneous across audit firms assuming all
audit firms adhere to Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAPs) and Generally
Accepted Auditing Standard (GAASs). However,
Dopuch and Simunic (1982) argued that that
credibility must be associated with an observable
characteristic, such as brand name. Since the
detailed information of various audit firms are
not publicly disclosed, auditors need not be
perceived to be homogeneolls in the quality of
their services. Such an attribute is difficult and
costly to develop as well as maintain, thus it must
have market value. Therefore, market for auditors
should be characterized by product
differentiation, as are all competitive producing
units. In other words, there is heterogeneity
among the audit firms. From the observed two-
tier audit industI)' structure, Dopuch and Simunic
inferred that higher prestige audit firm is more
credible than the others.
Auditor ~'Iitch prior to the company going
public is fairly common and widely explained as
one of management's efforts to reduce
uncertainty in emerging market. Carpenter and
Strawser (1971) explained this phenomenon as
necessary to sell their offering at the highest
possible price. This widely held view suggests
that the employment of a reputable audit firm
will increase the offer price of the new issue and
investors may be predisposed to accept lower
returns in exchange for greater certainty.
There is ample of evidence on underpricing
of the firm's equity securities (Rock 1986; Beatty
and Ritter 1986; Balvers el aL 1988; and Allen
and Faulhaber 1989). Various explanations have
been offered for the underpricing: for example,
Baron (1982) proposed that the investment
banker is 'better informed' than the issuing
company as to the demand of issuing company's
issue and therefore the issuer underprice to
ensure success of the issue. Rock (1986) and
Beatty and Ritter (1986) proposed two classes of
investors, 'informed' and 'uninformed' investors
are assumed to exist, and underpricing is to
entice the informed investors to participate to
reveal the value of the issue. These explanations
suggest that there is a positive relationship
between ex ante uncertainty and the undeJ1>ricing
of 1PO.
With regard to choice of auditors at the
time of listing, Simunic and Stein (1987) suggest
that audit firm disassociated themselves by
differentiation on the dimensions of control
and credibility. Product line motivates
management's auditor choice in IPG market.
The form of the underwriter agreement, the
proportion of common stocks held by outsiders
after the lPG, and a measure of uncertainty are
related to the choice of which auditing firm is
chosen. Beatty (1989) provides evidence
consistent with Simunic and Stein (1987) that
larger and less risky IPO clients tend to hire the
Big Eight auditing firms.
Titman and Trueman (1986) suggests that
auditor quality provides useful information to
investors to assess the value of the IPG firm.
They showed analytically that an entrepreneur
has the incen tive to choose level of auditor
quality that correctly reveals the private
information about the firm. They suggest that
the more reputable auditors charge a premium
price for additional credibility they bring. Such
auditors are more likely to uncover and disclose
adverse information about the firm.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
Dala
This study covers 213 firms listed on the main
second boards of KLSE over the period 1996 to
2000. The information on offer price and the
traded price of these firms was extracted from
KLSE records, the company prospectus and
annual reports. Information prior to listing, was
obtained from the Registrar of Companies
(ROC). The Composite Index is used as a proxy
of the market portfolio and the values of the
index were extracted from the daily diary of
KLSE.
To determine the impact of auditor switch
prior to going public, the choice of auditors at
the time of listing was examined. Auditor changes
that occurred more than two fmancial periods
prior to the IPG were not considered.
Analysis
To determine the price impact of various auditor
switches, the audit firms are categorised into nyo
categories, the 'Big Eight' (and subsequently
'Big Five') as Tier I audit firms and Ton-Big
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AIR (Tier 1 audilors) <AIR (Non Tier 1 audilors)
It is hypolhesized lhal lhe IPQs audited by
the Tier 1 auditor signals lesser e."'C anteuncertainry
than IPOs audited by Non-Tier I auditor, thus
earning lower average initial returns (AIR),
Similarly, IPOs with downward auditor switch
(i.e. switch from Tier 1 auditor to Non-Tier 1
auditor) resulting an increases the ex ante
uncertainty, thus earning a higher initial returns.
is estimated for all categories of switch sample. It
is defined as the difference between the initial
return on the new issue and the return on the
markel, lhat is, MAJR = IR - MR. The average
market adjusted initial return (AMAIR) for each
group is computed.
(3)
LMAJR
AMAJR, '
N,
Where AMAIRg: average market adjusted initial
return of respective groups
MAlRjt: market adjusted initial return
of respective groups
N~: number of firms in each of the
groups
b. [PO with No Auditor Switch
1. Remain "rith the same Tier 1 auditor
2. Remain with the same Non·Tier 1 auditor
The IPQ with no auditor switch serves as the
control group.
The initial return for a firm going public is
defined as the first day gross return La an investor
who acquires a share and sells at the closing
price on the first day of public trading.
The initial return in percentage is:
a. [PO with Auditor Switch
1. Switch from no·Tier 1 audit firm to Tier
audit firm - upward switch.
2. Switch from Tierl audit firm to Non-Tier 1
audit firm - downward switch.
3. Switch from Tier I audit firm to another
Tier 1 audit firm - lateral switch.
4. Switch from non-Tier 1 audit firm to another
Non-Tier 1 audit firm - lateral switch.
(Non Tier 1) audit firms (Dopuch and Simunic
1982). Tier I firms are used to proxy higher
prestige audit firm with greater reputational
capital, whereas the Non-tier 1 firms' proxy the
less prestige audits firms with lesser reputational
capital. To analyse the impact of auditor switch
during the issue, the data on auditors are sorted
into six groups in two different categories:
Where PMe: Market price at the close of first
lrading day, and
p lPO: IPQ's offer price.
The return on the market is computed for
the identical time period for each IPQ. The
market return in percentage is defined as:
laleral switch) > AIR (Tier 1AIR (Non Tier 1
lateral switch)
AIR (downward switch) > AIR (Tier 1 no switch)
However, for the price effect of IPOs with
lateral auditor switches (i.e. Tier 1 auditor S'."itch
to another tier) auditor or Non-Tier 1 auditor
switch to another Non-Tier 1 auditor) is more
ambiguous, and a mixed signal is expected.
However, the initial returns of IPQ with Non-
Tier 1 lateral auditor switch are expected to
generate higher initial returns than the IPQ
with Tier 1 lateral auditor s\'",itch. This could be
expressed as:
(1)
(2)
KLCl"c - KLClp(MR) = -.----x 100%
KLClp
Market Return
PMC - P11'O
Initial Return (IR) = ---- x 100%
Where KLCIMC: Kuala Lumpur Composite Index
at the close of first trading day,
and
KLCIp: Kuala Lumpur Composite Index
at the close of the previous
lrading day.
The market adjusted initial return (MAlR)
The student-t statistics are used to test the
statistical significance of the obsen'ed values.
FINDINGS
lPOs - Board of Listing and Auditor Choice
A summary of the sample of main and second
board firms and their audiLOr classifications is
presented in Table 1. The sample consists of213
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initial public offerings with 75 Main Board and
138 Second Board firms. Fifty-seven (76%) of
the main board Hrms and 78 (56%) of the
second board firms were audited by tier 1
auditors. Non-Tier 1 auditors audited the
remainder. A dominance by Tier 1 auditors
firms in the Main Board is little more than half
of the Second Board firms. The bias towards
choice by Tier 1 auditors indicates the
management's preference to signal the
companies' credibility, integrity, reliability of the
published information and responsibility towards
potential investors. The Main Board IPQs are
expected to employ the services of Tier 1 auditors
to sustain their reputation as larger, more
established and less risky firms. Tier 1 auditors'
are perceived to be more stringent in providing
better quality audit and help reduce uncertainty
for inviting public.
Auditor Choice and Initial Returns
Table 2 shows initial return of main board and
second board firms audited by both Tier 1 and
Non-Tier 1 auditors.
Initial return for overall IPQ sample audited
by Tier 1 and Non-Tier 1 auditors are 117.30%
and 134.04% respectively. However, there is no
significant difference (p=O.293) between these
initial returns, implying no price effect of auditor
choice (Tier 1 or Non Tier 1) decision during
listing. Similarly, there are no significant
differences at acceptance level of .10 between
initial returns of Main Board firms audited by
either Tier 1 or Non-Tier 1 audit firms. Similar
results are observed for Second Board firms.
For firms audited by Tier I auditors only,
there is a significant difference (at .05 acceptance
level) in initial returns with a t=1.996 for the
value of the main and Second Board firms.
Similarly, for firms audited by Non·Tier 1 audit
firms only, there is a significant difference (at
.01 acceptance level) between initial returns with
a t=3.94 of Main and Second Board firms.
These findings are consistent with the
product differentiation hypothesis proposed by
DeAngelo (198Ia;198Ib). The Tier I auditors
appears to provide higher quality audit service
that reduces the IPOs' ex ante uncertainty more
than Non-Tier I audit firms. This results in
lower initial returns for firm engaging Tier 1
auditor. Despite the observed audit firm's
reputation effect on the initial returns, the lower
returns of Main Board firms might also be
attributable to the perceived lower risk compared
to Second Board firms that are less stable and
more volatile.
TABLE I
Sampled main board and second board IPOs and their auditor choice
Auditors Classification
Listing Board Tier 1 Auditors
Number %
Non Tier 1
Auditors
Number %
Combined (Tierl
and NonTierl)
Number %
Main Board
Second Board
Combined (Main and
Second Board)
57
78
135
26.8
36.6
63.4
18
60
78
8.4
28.2
36.6
75
138
213
35.2
64.8
100.0
TABLE 2
Auditors choice and IPOs' initial return
Auditors Classification
Tier 1 Auditors Non Tier 1 Auditors
Listing Board
Main Board
Second Board
Combined (Main and Second Board)
Mean Return
(%)
95.69
133.09
117.30
Std Dev.
(%)
97.76
119.58
112.05
Mean Return
(%)
76.27
151.37
134.04
Std Dev.
(%)
54.71
108.40
103.34
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[POs and Auditor Changes
The distributional characteristics of various
categories of auditor switch for the newly listed
Main and Second board firms are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3 shows thal only 24 (abollt 18%)
firms did change their auditors at the time of
listing, and mLDority of the change (18 out of
the 24 firms) were in the upward switches (Non-
Tier 1 to Tier 1) category. Seventeen of the
upward switch firms were from the second board.
Eighty-two percent of the sampled firms did not
switch auditors when listing. Of these, a majority
is from Second Board firms that engaged the
services of Tier 1 audit firms. The high
proportion of no-switch firms may be due to a
combination of factors.
The large numbers of IPOs were
incorporated shortly prior to the listing, therefore
the choice of auditors had been duly considered
and was not expected to change within such a
short time period. Possibly firms that were
incorporated for a long time, a majority of firms
changed their auditors earlier than two financial
periods prior to listing. In the process of
complying with the capital and profit
performance requirements, these firms switched
their auditors in anticipation of going public
three years or five years ahead.
Auditor Switch and Initial Returns
Table 4 summarizes the various categories of
auditor switch and their respective initial returns.
For the Main Board listings, the initial
returns for non-switch Tier I firms are larger
(94,86%) than the initial returns of non-switch
Non-Tier 1 firms (76.27%), the difference is not
statistically significant. However, the firms in the
upward switch category recorded 142.40% initial
returns. For the Second Board, the Tier 1 non-
switch firms generated 129% initial returns,
which are lower than the non-switch Non-Tier 1
TABLE 3
Auditors switch during IPOs
Type of Switches Main Board SecondBoard Combined (Main
and Secondboard)
No. % No. % No. %
Tier 1 unchanged (no switch) 56 26.29 60 28.17 116 54.46
TIer 1 to another TIer 1 (Ialernl S\"iteh) 0 0.00 I 0.47 1 0.47
TIer I to Non lier 1 (downward S\,~tch) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Non Tier 1 unchanged (no switch) 18 8.45 55 25.82 73 34.27
Non Tier 1 1O another Non 0 0.00 5 2.35 5 2.35
Tier 1 (lateral switch)
Non Tier 1 to Tier 1 (upward switch) 0.47 17 7.98 18 8.45
Total 75 35.21 138 64.79 213 100.00
TABLE 4
Auditors switches and IPOs' initial return
Type of Switches Main Board Second Board
Tier I unchanged (no switch)
Tier I to another Tier I (lateral switch)
Tier 1 to Non Tier 1 (downward switch)
Non Tier 1 unchanged (no switch)
I on Tier 1 to another Non Tier 1
(lateral switch)
Non Tier 1 to Tier 1 (upward switch)
Total
Mean Returns
(%)
94.86
o
o
76.27
o
142.40
75
Std Dev.
(%)
98.44
o
o
54.71
o
35.21
Mean Returns
(%)
129.15
70.00
o
149.58
171.00
150.70
138
Std Dev.
(%)
124.85
o
102.26
177.84
103.45
64.79
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firms' returns of 149%; the difference is not
statistically significant. Firms that had upward
switch (from Non~Tier 1 to Tier 1) recorded
150% returns. These findings are basically
inconsistent with the auditor reputation
hypothesis, which postulates that firms audited
by reputable auditors should have lower initial
returns due to less uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the hypothesised
relationship between the firms' choice of quality
differentiated audit firms (reputable (or Tier 1)
and non-reputable (Non-Tier 1)) audit firms
and the initial returns at listing. The findings
appear to suggest that there is an inclination for
newly listed firms to engage Tier 1 audit firms,
probably due to management's intention of
signaling the firm's favourable private
information and credibility of the reported
financial information. Investment banker's and
other advisors' prefer to engage Tier 1 auditors
to project a better image that could increase the
marketability of the issue and reduce the risk of
under-subscription.
The findings also show that there is no
significant difference in the initial returns of
IPOs firms engaging Tier I and Non-Tier I
audit firms. However, there is a higher and
significant initial return for Second Board firms
at listing compared to Main Board firms. Firms
that had upward switch (Tier 2 to Tier 1) showed
higher returns as compared to lateral change in
the same tier, inconsistent with the auditor
reputation hypothesis. This results, however,
could be biased by the large number of newly
listed firms that did not switch auditors at listing,
probably due to lack of time to make changes
before listing, and/or have engaged Tier 1
auditors at incorporation in anticipation of
listing. These results do not support the widely
held view that firms that seek listing do switch
auditors prior to their listing for positive market
signaling. The results indicate that auditor's
reputation is not an important determinant of
the IPOs initial return. These findings are
consistent to those documented by Shamsher
and Annuar (1997) that investors are indifferent
to the quality of audit services provided by Tier
I and Non-Tier I audit firms. It is highly probable
the differences in the listing board characteristics
are important determinant of initial returns at
listing.
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